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1.  From the Classical and Neoclassical Viewpoints to the Modern Perspective 
 
 
Conventional wisdom about the relationship between income distribution and economic 
development has been subjected to dramatic transformation in the past century. While the 
Classical economists advanced the hypothesis that inequality is beneficial for economic 
development, the neoclassical paradigm, which subsequently dominated the field of 
macroeconomics, dismissed the Classical hypothesis and advanced the viewpoint that the study of 
income distribution has no significance in the understanding of the growth process.   
 
A metamorphosis in these perspectives has taken place in the past two decades, and analysis of 
the role of income distribution in economic development was brought in from the cold.
1  Both 
theory and recent empirical evidence have demonstrated that income distribution does, in fact, 
have a significant impact on the growth process. Moreover, unlike the Classical viewpoint, which 
underlined the beneficial effects of inequality for the growth process, the modern perspective has 
highlighted the potential adverse effects of inequality on the growth process. 
 
 
1.1. The Classical and the Neoclassical Approach 
 
Classical approach advanced the hypothesis that inequality is beneficial for economic 
development in the post-industrialization period (Keynes, 1920, and Kaldor, 1957).
2 It suggested 
that since the marginal propensity to save increases with wealth, inequality channels resources 
towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher, increasing aggregate savings, 
capital accumulation, and economic growth.
3   
 
The classical hypothesis, however, was implicitly dismissed by the representative agent paradigm 
that had dominated the field of macroeconomics. The influential neoclassical approach rejected 
the relevance of heterogeneity, and thus the distribution of income, for macroeconomic analysis, 
interpreting implicitly the observed relationship between inequality and economic growth as 





                                                           
1 This metamorphosis was the focus of Atkinson (1997)’s presidential address to the Royal Economic 
Association. 
2 Development economists advanced an additional hypothesis about the relationship between inequality and 
economic development that is largely tangential to the understating of the effect of inequality on economic 
growth in the modern, post-industrialization era. As argued by Rosenstein-Rodan (1948), Lewis (1954), 
Baldwin, (1956), and North (1959), and formulated by Murphy, Shliefer and Vishny (1989), in the absence 
of international demand for domestic industrial goods, a wide distribution of income from the leading 
agricultural sector may be critical for industrialization.   
3 Echoing the insight of the Classical economists, it was established that within a neoclassical growth 
model with a convex saving function, the distribution of income might lead to a two-class equilibrium 
(Stiglitz, 1969) where the less egalitarian one is superior (Bourguignon, 1981). 
4 This viewpoint can be traced to Kuznets (1955)’s findings of the inverse U relationship between 
inequality and economic development, and his suggestion that they reflect causation from development to 
distribution. 1.2. The Origins of the Modern Perspective 
 
The Neoclassical viewpoint has been challenged in the past two decades, as both theories and 
subsequent empirical evidence have demonstrated that income distribution has a significant 
impact on the growth process. The origin of the modern perspective can be traced to Galor and 
Zeira (1988, 1993).  In contrast to the representative agent approach that dominated the field of 
macroeconomics for several decades, Galor and Zeira analyzed the role of heterogeneity in the 
determination of macroeconomic activity. They advanced the novel viewpoint that heterogeneity, 
and thus income distribution, plays an important role in the determination of aggregate economic 
activity and economic growth. Their research demonstrated that under plausible conditions (i.e., 
credit market imperfections and fixed costs in the acquisition of human capital), income 
distribution has a long lasting effect on investment in human capital, aggregate income, and 
economic development.
5 Moreover, in contrast to the Classical hypothesis, which underscored the 
virtues of inequality for economic growth, this research advanced the hypothesis that inequality, 
in the presence of credit market imperfections, may be detrimental for human capital formation 
and economic development. 
 
The modern perspective about the relationship between inequality and economic development has 
subsequently evolved, resulting in hundreds of research papers that have highlighted the adverse 
effect of inequality on the process of development.
6  The initial research on the subject has been 
widely classified into two broad approaches for the examination of the relationship between 





1.3. The Credit Market Imperfections Channel 
 
The credit market imperfection approach explored the implications and the robustness of the 
effect of inequality on the process of development in the presence of credit market imperfections. 
 
Galor and Zeira have demonstrated that in the presence of credit market imperfections and fixed 
costs associated with investment in education, occupational choices (and thus the efficient 
segmentation of the labor force between skilled and unskilled workers) are affected by the 
distribution of income. In particular, if the interest rate for borrowers is significantly higher than 
that for lenders, inequality may result in an under-investment in human capital.
8 Inequality may 
                                                           
5 The main hypothesis of the credit market imperfection approach is robust, however, to the removal of the 
assumption of a fixed cost of education or investment projects, as long as savings are an increasing function 
of wealth (Moav, 2002 and Galor and Moav, 2004). 
6 This book, written from a macro-growth perspective, focuses on the literature that deals with the effect of 
inequality on the development process, rather than on the forces that prevent (Loury, 1981) or generate 
persistent inequality within an economy (Benabou, 1996, Durlauf, 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996, 
and Mookherjee and Ray, 2003), or across economies (Galor and Mountford, 2008).  
7 An additional line of less influential research has focused on the effect of inequality on aggregate demand 
and thus on innovations and growth, in the presence of non-homothetic preferences (Chou and Talmain, 
1996, Matsuyama, 2000,  Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006). 
8  The provision of public education may mitigate part of the adverse effect of inequality. Nevertheless, the 
potential adverse effect of inequality still operates via the differential effects of the foregone earnings 
associated with education on investment in human capital in different segments of the income distribution, 
as well as through its differential impact on the allocation of parental inputs in the production of the 
children’s human capital (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997b) and on the ability of parents to select optimal therefore adversely affect macroeconomic activity and economic development in the short-run, 
and due to intergenerational transfers and their effect on the persistence of inequality, it may 
adversely affect economic development in the long-run as well.
9  
 
The basic Galor-Zeira model establishes the potential adverse effect of inequality on economic 
growth in an economy in which wages, for simplicity, are unaffected by the composition of the 
labor force. However, as established in the second model developed in Galor and Zeira (1993), 
the main hypothesis is robust to the endogenization of wages and thus to the incorporation of 
interdependence in investment decisions across dynasties.  
 
The credit market imperfection approach for the study of the effects of income distribution on 
economic growth, which subsequently emerged, maintained the two fundamental assumptions of 
the Galor-Zeira model (i.e., credit market imperfections and fixed costs associated with 
investment), and established the robustness of its main hypothesis.
10 Notably, Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) examine the effect of inequality on a different type of occupational choice (i.e., 
the choice between becoming an entrepreneur or a worker, rather than the choice between 
becoming either a skilled or an unskilled worker). They demonstrate that if credit markets are 
imperfect and fixed costs are associated with entrepreneurial activities, inequality may result in an 
under-investment in entrepreneurial activity and may therefore be harmful for economic 
development.
11  Their study establishes that as long as wages are endogenous, the main 
hypothesis of the credit market imperfection approach as a whole is robust to the introduction of 
random shocks to the outcome of investment (in human capital or entrepreneurial activities).
12   
 
The interplay between income inequality and equality of opportunities that was emphasized by 
Galor and Zeira led to an additional strand of research within the credit market imperfection 
approach. This research examines the effect of inequality on the degree of intergenerational 
mobility and thus the efficiency in the allocation of talents across occupations (Fershtman, 
Murphy and Weiss, 1996, Owen and Weil, 1998, Maoz and Moav, 1999, Checchi, Ichino and 
Rustichini, 1999, and Hassler, Mora and Zeira, 2007).
 13 
 
                                                                                                                                  
neighborhoods, and thus schooling environment, for their children (Benabou, 1996, Durlauf, 1996, 
Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996). 
9 While wage inequality and its effects on the skill premium may provide an incentive for human capital 
formation that may counterbalance the constraints on efficient investment in human capital associated with 
inequality, most forms of inequality (e.g., wealth inequality as well as inequality in the distribution of 
income between labor, capital and land), do not affect the incentive to invest in human capital. 
Furthermore, in sufficiently poor economies, where the fixed cost of education is high in comparison to the 
level of income per capita, inequality may permit at least some individuals to undertake investment in 
human capital, and thus more inequality would be expected to be associated with higher investment in 
education. 
10 The Galor-Zeira setup was further exploited by Quah (1996) to shed light on the emergence of 
convergence clubs (and thus persistent inequality) in the world economy, in the presence of imperfect 
capital mobility across economies and fixed cost of investment. 
11 Aghion and Bolton (1997) further demonstrate that redistribution improves the efficiency of the 
economy, because it enhances equality of opportunity and the trickle-down process from the rich to the 
poor. 
12 See also Piketty (1997). 
13 The adverse effect of inequality on occupational choice and intergenerational mobility is robust to the 
removal of the central assumption of credit market imperfections as long as parental human capital and 
social background are introduced into the analysis (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a, 1997b, Hassler and Mora, 
2000, Zilcha, 2003, and Mejia and St-Pierre, 2008, Brezis and Temin, 2008). Furthermore, the interaction between income inequality and credit market imperfections has been 
placed at the center of an important literature that examines the relationship between segregation 
and persistent inequality.  These studies have demonstrated that in the presence of credit market 
imperfections, inequality enhances segregation across communities, and thus, in the presence of 
local externalities in the production of human capital, it may generate persistent education and 
income gaps (Benabou, 1996, Durlauf, 1994, 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996).  
 
 
1.4. The Political Economy Channel 
 
The political economy approach further advanced the viewpoint that inequality is harmful for 
economic development. Earlier studies have argued that inequality generates a pressure to adopt 
redistributive policies, and that distortion associated with these policies adversely affect 
investment in physical and human capital and thus the growth process.   
 
The incentives for productive accumulation of physical capital, human capital, and knowledge 
hinge on the ability of individuals to privately appropriate the return on their investment. In 
societies that are characterized by inequality, distributional conflict may bias political decisions in 
favor of appropriation and may therefore diminish investment and economic growth. In 
particular, using the median voter paradigm, it was hypothesized that in a more equitable society, 
taxation on physical capital (Alesina and Rodrik, 2004) and human capital  (Persson and 
Tebellini, 2004 and Perotti, 1993) will be lower, limiting the degree of distortions in investment 
decisions, and promoting economic growth.  
 
In light of the inconsistency of this mechanism with empirical evidence (Perotti, 1996), 
subsequent theories advanced the hypothesis that inequality may in fact generate an incentive for 
better endowed agents to lobby against redistribution, preventing efficient redistribution policies 
from being implemented (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1996, Benabou, 2000, 2002).  
 
Others have examined the long-run effects of inequality in the ownership of factors of production 
on the incentive for better endowed agents to block the implementation of institutional changes 
and policies that promote human capital formation and thus economic growth (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2000, and Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009).  
 
 
2.  A Unified Theory of Inequality and Development 
 
The impressive research that constituted the modern perspective on the relationship between 
inequality and economic development has been initially largely segmented. It lacked a unified 
hypothesis regarding the role of inequality in the process of development, particularly in light of 
the contrasting predictions generated by the classical and the modern approaches.  
 
2.1.   From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation as the Main Engine of Growth  
 
The development of a unified theory of the dynamic implications of inequality on the growth 
process (Galor and Moav, 2004) has provided a needed intertemporal reconciliation between the 
Classical viewpoint and the modern perspective, while permitting the dominating theories within 
the modern perspective to be placed within a broader structure. 
 
The theory suggests that the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital 
accumulation as the prime engine of economic growth has changed the qualitative impact of inequality on the process of development. In early stages of industrialization, as physical capital 
accumulation is a prime source of economic growth, inequality enhances the process of 
development by channeling resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is 
higher. In later stages of development, however, as physical capital accumulates, the demand for 
human capital increases (due to capital-skill complementarity) and human capital becomes the 
prime engine of economic growth.
14 A more equal distribution of income, in the presence of 
credit constraints, stimulates investment in human capital and promotes economic growth. Lastly, 
as economies becomes wealthier and credit constraints become less binding while the differences 
in the marginal propensity to save subside, the aggregate effect of income distribution on the 
growth process becomes less significant. 
 
The central hypothesis of this unified approach stems from the recognition that human capital 
accumulation and physical capital accumulation are fundamentally asymmetric. In contrast to 
physical capital, human capital is inherently embodied in humans and the existence of 
physiological constraints subjects its accumulation at the individual level to diminishing returns. 
The aggregate stock of human capital would be therefore larger if its accumulation would be 
widely spread among individuals in society, whereas the aggregate productivity of the stock of 
physical capital is largely independent of the distribution of its ownership in society. This 
asymmetry between the accumulation of human and physical capital suggests therefore that as 
long as credit constraints are largely binding, a more equal distribution of income is conducive for 
human capital accumulation, whereas provided that the marginal propensity to save increases 
with income, inequality is conducive for physical capital accumulation. 
 
The theory, therefore, provides an intertemporal reconciliation between the conflicting viewpoints 
about the effect of inequality on economic growth. It suggests that the classical viewpoint, 
regarding the positive effect of inequality on the process of development, reflects the state of the 
world in early stages of industrialization, when physical capital accumulation is the prime engine 
of economic growth. In contrast, the central hypothesis of the credit market imperfection 
approach regarding the negative effect of equality on economic growth reflects later stages of 
development when human capital accumulation becomes the prime engine of economic growth, 
and credit constraints are largely binding.  
 
Although the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a 
prime engine of economic growth in currently developed economies is instrumental for 
understanding of the role of inequality in their process of development, this research is especially 
relevant for currently less developed economies (LDCs) that may have evolved differently. In 
LDCs, the presence of international capital inflows diminishes the role of inequality in 
stimulating physical capital accumulation. Moreover, the adoption of skilled-biased technologies 
has increased the return to human capital and, thus, given credit constraints, has strengthened the 
positive effect of a more equal distribution of income on human capital accumulation and 
economic growth.  
 
The theory generates a testable implication about the effect of inequality on economic growth, 
which may provide greatly needed theoretical guidance for empirical research in this field. In 
contrast to the credit market imperfection approach, which suggests that the effect of inequality 
                                                           
14 The rise in the demand for skilled labor may be viewed as an outcome of (embodied) technological 
acceleration. As argued by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Shultz (1975) and established empirically by 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), educated individuals have a comparative advantage in a changing 
technological environment.  
 depends on the country's level of income (i.e., inequality is beneficial for poor economies and 
harmful for rich ones), this research suggests that the effect of inequality on growth depends on 
the relative return to physical and human capital. In economies in which the return to human 
capital is relatively lower, inequality is beneficial for economic growth, whereas in economies in 
which the return to human capital is relatively higher and credit constraints are largely binding, 
equality is beneficial for economic growth.  
 
 
2.2.  The Emergence of Economic Conflict Between the Landed Aristocracy and the 
Capitalists  
 
While the process of industrialization raised the importance of human capital in the production 
process, reflecting its complementarity with physical capital and technology, human capital 
accumulation has not benefited all sectors of the economy, resulting in a sub-optimal level of 
investment in human capital from a growth perspective.  
 
As argued by Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), the transition from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy changed the nature of the main economic conflict in society. Unlike an agrarian 
economy, which was characterized by a conflict of interest between the landed aristocracy and 
the masses, the process of industrialization has brought about an additional conflict between the 
entrenched landed elite and the emerging capitalist elite. The capitalists, who were striving for an 
educated labor force, supported policies that promoted the education of the masses, whereas 
landowners, whose interests lay in the reduction of the mobility of the rural labor force, favored 
policies that deprived the masses from education.  
 
In light of a lower degree of complementarity between human capital and land, a rise in the level 
of education increased the productivity of labor in industrial production more than in agriculture, 
decreasing the return to land due to labor migration and an associated rise in wages. Thus, while 
industrialists had a direct economic incentive to support education policies that would foster 
human capital formation, landowners had no economic incentives to support these growth 




The adverse effect of the implementation of public education on landowners' income from 
agricultural production is magnified by the concentration of land ownership, and thus, as long as 
landowners affect the political process and thereby the implementation of growth-enhancing 
education policies, inequality in the distribution of land ownership is a hurdle for human capital 
accumulation, slowing the process of industrialization and the transition to modern growth. 
Economies in which land was more equally distributed, implemented earlier public education 
campaigns, and benefited from the emergence of a skill-intensive industrial sector and a rapid 
process of development. In contrast, among economies marked by a more unequal distribution of 
land ownership, land abundance that was a source of richness in early stages of development, led 
in later stages to under-investment in human capital, an unskilled-intensive industrial sector, and 
a slower growth process. Thus, variations in the distribution of land ownership across countries 
contributed to variations in the industrial composition of the economy, and thereby to divergent 
development patterns across the globe. 
 
                                                           
15 Landowners may benefit from the economic development of other segments of the economy due to 
capital ownership, their households’ labor supply to the industrial sector, the provision of public goods, and 
demand spillovers from economic development of the urban sector. This hypothesis is consistent with historical evidence underlined by Galor, Moav and Vollrath 
(2009) that suggests that indeed the distribution of land ownership affected the nature of the 
transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy and has been significant in the emergence of 
sustained differences in human capital formation and growth patterns across countries. Moreover, 
the adverse effect of the concentration of land ownership on education expenditure is confirmed 
empirically by Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) based on data from the beginning of the 20th 
century in the US.  Variations in the concentration of land ownership as well as in public 
spending on education across states in the U.S. are exploited in order to demonstrate that 
inequality in the distribution of land ownership was indeed a hurdle for public investment in 
human capital.  
 
 
2.3.  Inequality and the Implementation of Oppressive Institutions 
 
An alternative mechanism that underlines the adverse effect of inequality on human capital 
formation and economic development has been advanced by Engerman and Sokoloff (2000). 
They argued and provided evidence that geographical conditions that led to income inequality 
brought about oppressive institutions (e.g., restricted access to the democratic process and to 
education) designed to maintain the political power of the elite and to preserve the existing 
inequality between the elite and the masses.  Similarly, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) 
maintain that reversals in economic performance across countries have a colonial origin, 
reflecting institutional reversals that were introduced by European colonialism across the globe. 
"Reversals of fortune" reflect the imposition of extractive institutions by the European 
colonialists in regions where favorable geographical conditions led to prosperity, and the 
implementation of growth-enhancing institutions in poorer regions. 
 
Thus, Engerman and Sokolof (2000) underlined the role of the sustained conflict between the 
elite and the masses in the delay in the implementation of growth enhancing educational policies 
and thus in the adverse effect of inequality on the process of development. Their viewpoint about 
the nature of the conflict, as well as that of Acemoglu et al. (2005), suggest the perpetual 
desirability of extractive institutions for the ruling elite. In contrast, Galor, Moav and Vollrath 
(2009) advance the viewpoint that, in fact, economic development may ultimately alter the 
incentives of the elite to block growth-enhancing education policies.  In light of a conflict of 
interest among the economic elites (i.e., industrialists and landowners), and a partial cooperation 
between the elite (i.e., the industrialists) and the masses, the timing of the implementation of 
growth-enhancing education policies was affected by the effect of economic development on the 
degree of asset diversification held by the divided elite. Unlike the conflict-based political 
mechanism that governs the hypothesis of Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2005), the hypothesis advanced by Galor and Moav (2006) and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) 
emphasizes a direct economic mechanism (i.e., the adverse effect of education reforms on the 
land rental rate) that governs the relationship between inequality and the process of development. 
In particular, they demonstrate that even if the political structure in the economy remains 
unchanged, economic development and a gradual diversification of the assets held by the landed 
aristocracy may ultimately trigger the implementation of growth-promoting institutions once the 
stake of the landed aristocracy in the efficient operation of the industrial sector dominates their 
overall economic interest.
16   
 
                                                           
16 Rajan (2009) reinforces this thesis, suggesting that rent preservation and its interaction with inequality in 
ownership over factor endowment is a recipe for paralysis and poverty.  2.4.     Inequality as a trigger for Growth Promoting Social, Political, and Economic 
Transitions 
 
Inequality and its association with socio-political instability have been identified as an additional 
adverse force in the process of development. In particular, the effect of inequality on social 
conflict and on political and educational reforms was examined by Alesina and Perotti (1996), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), as well as Gradstein 
(2007).
17 These studies suggest that reforms and redistribution from the elite to the masses 
diminish the tendency for sociopolitical instability and may therefore stimulate investment and 
economic growth. In particular, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that the extension of the 
franchise during the 19th century can be viewed as a commitment device to ensure future income 
redistribution from the elite to the masses. 
 
In contrast, Galor and Moav (2006) have argued that the transformation in class structure and 
inequality can be viewed as a byproduct of a productive cooperation between capitalists and 
workers, rather than an outcome of a divisive class struggle.
18  In accordance with the unified 
approach for the study of inequality and economic development, this line of research suggests 
that capital accumulation in the process of industrialization gradually intensified the relative 
scarcity of skilled labor and generated an incentive for human capital accumulation. Investment in 
human capital, however, has been sub-optimal due to credit market imperfections, and public 
investment in education has been therefore growth-enhancing, as per Galor and Zeira (1993). Due 
to the complementarity between physical and human capital in production, the capitalists were 
among the prime beneficiaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They 
therefore had the incentive to support the provision of public education that improved their 
economic well-being and contributed significantly to the demise of the capitalists-workers class 





2.5.  Gender Inequality, Fertility, and Economic Development  
 
As suggested by the unified approach, the replacement of physical capital accumulation by 
human capital accumulation as the prime engine of economic growth has changed the qualitative 
impact of inequality on the process of development. In early stages of industrialization, as 
physical capital accumulation is a prime source of economic growth, inequality enhances the 
process of development by channeling resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity 
to save is higher. In later stages of development, however, as physical capital accumulates and the 
demand for human capital increases, due to capital-skill complementarity, human capital becomes 
the prime engine of economic growth and a more egalitarian distribution of income stimulates 
investment in human capital and promotes economic growth.  
 
                                                           
17 See also Bowles and Gintis (1975). 
18 Mutually beneficial reforms are also considered by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Doepke and Zilibotti 
(2005). 
 
19 Mejia and Posada (2007) identify the conditions under which a social conflict lead to the transition to 
democracy and those under which purely economic forces lead to the transition, underlying the relative role 
of inequality, the importance of a human capital externalities in production, and the feasibility of 
redistribution by the masses. 
 The decline in gender inequality that was brought about by the rise in the demand for human 
capital in the process of development reinforced the positive association between a more 
egalitarian distribution of income and economic growth. The decline in gender inequality 
contributed to the onset of the demographic transition as well as to the rise in female labor force 
participation, fostering the growth process as a whole. The decline in the gender wage gap has 
affected household fertility decisions, female labor force participation and thus the growth 
process. As suggested by Galor and Weil (1996, 1999), technological progress and capital 
accumulation complemented mentally-intensive tasks and substituted for physically-intensive 
tasks in industrial production. In light of the comparative physiological advantage of men in 
physically-intensive tasks and of women in mentally-intensive tasks, the demand for women’s 
labor input gradually increased, inducing a decline in fertility rates, a significant increase in labor 
force participation, and a transition from stagnation to growth.  
 
Moreover, the decline in the overall level of inequality that was associated the emergence of 
human capital has been linked theoretically, empirically, and quantitatively to the reduction in 
fertility and therefore lower levels of investment in human capital and income (Galor and Zhang, 
1997, Dahan and Tsiddon, 1998, Kremer and Chen, 2002, De la Croix and Doepke, 2003, and 
Moav, 2005).  
 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
Several attempts have been made to examine the theoretical predictions of the credit market 
imperfections approach and the political economy approach about the effect of inequality and 
heterogeneity on economic growth. Consistent with the hypothesis advanced by the theories, 
early cross-country analyses by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Person and Tabellini (1994) and 
Perotti (1996) have established a negative association between the level of inequality and 
economic growth.  
 
Importantly, Perotti (1996) conducted a careful examination of the various channels through 
which inequality may affect economic growth, as proposed by the modern theoretical perspective. 
His study provides support for the Galor-Zeira hypothesis, showing that inequality is indeed 
associated with lower level of human capital formation, and lower human capital formation is 
associated with lower levels of economic growth.
20 Further support for the main predictions of the 
education channel advanced in the context of the credit market imperfection approach has been 
generated by Deninger and Squire (1998). Utilizing the distribution of land as a proxy for the 
distribution of assets, they find that initial inequality has a significant adverse effect on education 
and economic growth. Moreover, consistent with the theories advanced by the credit market 
imperfections approach – that these imperfections ought to have a larger effect on the investment 




                                                           
20 In line with related theoretical arguments that human capital formation and fertility are negatively related 
and thus inequality would be expected to have contrasting effects on these two variables (e.g., Galor and 
Zhang, 1997), Perotti (1996) suggest that the human capital channel is reinforced by the introduction of 
fertility.  Inequality is associated with higher fertility rates and a lower level of investment in human 
capital, which are in turn associated with lower economic growth. 
21 The adverse effects of financial constraints on economic development is well established (e.g.,  Levine , 
2005). In contrast to the human capital channel, Perotti (1996)’s examination of the political economy 
channel was not favorable to the theories advanced by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson 
and Tabelini (1994). His findings refute this early hypothesis of the political economy approach, 
demonstrating that in contrast to their proposed channel, inequality is in fact associated with 
lower levels of taxation, while lower levels of taxation, contrary to the theories, are associated 
with lower level of economic growth.  
 
Later studies have deviated from the desirable examination of the channels through which 
inequality may affect growth, and restricted their attention to the reduced form relationship 
between inequality and growth. Notably, Forbes (2000) and Barro (2000) examined the effect of 
inequality on economic growth in a panel of countries. They find a positive and zero effect, 
respectively, of an increase in inequality on economic growth. These findings, however, ought to 
be interpreted very cautiously. They appear to have no bearing on the validity of the theories and 
are not very informative about the overall effect of inequality. First, these studies examine the 
effect of inequality beyond its effects through education, fertility, and investment. Barro (2000) 
has found that, once controls for education, fertility, and investment are introduced, there is no 
relationship between inequality and economic growth in the entire sample. His findings, 
therefore, suggest that inequality does not have a direct effect on growth beyond its effects 
through education, fertility and investment (i.e., the dominating channels through which 
inequality operates), implying perhaps that the dominating channels through which inequality 
operates are those proposed in the literature. In particular, if the control for fertility is dropped in 
Barro (2000), the effect of inequality on growth is significantly negative, as predicted by the 
theory. Moreover, these studies examine the effect of inequality in the short run (i.e., the effect of 
inequality on the average growth rate in the subsequent 5-10 years), while as suggested by the 
theories, inequality is likely to have mostly longer-run effects (e.g., via the formation of human 
capital). 
  
Moreover, even within the context of the limited scope of the studies of Forbes (2000) and Barro 
(2000), their econometric methodology and their findings have been challenged.  Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003) argued that the linear regression structure imposed in previous studies is 
inconsistent with the predictions of the theories and the qualitative findings may be an artifact of 
the imposed linearity. They find that changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with 
lower growth rates. Moreover, in line with the adverse long-run impact of inequality proposed by 
the theories, they find a negative relationship between growth rates and lagged inequality.  
 
Recently, Easterly (2007) has reaffirmed the hypothesis advanced by the modern theories that 
inequality has an adverse effect on human capital formation and economic development. Using 
agricultural endowments as an instrument for inequality, in order to overcome concerns about 
measurement errors and the endogeneity of inequality, his cross-country analysis suggests that 
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